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I INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 10 years the Government has adopted various economic and legislative 
measures to overcome a decline in employment, productivity and income. Although 
New Zealand may now be on track towards sustained e :onomic growth, there have 
been questions as to the efficacy, political legitimacy, ar d even legality of some of the 
reforms that were implemented to overcome the slump. 1 The impending judgment of 
JOM Lawson v Housing New Zealand and Ministers of Housing and Finance,2 
concerns particularly the effect of the changes in the housing sector. 
There is no express "right" to adequate housing in New Zealand domestic law. But the 
issue in the Lawson case is whether some of the Government ' s actions were a breach 
of what is argued to be such a right under international aw. As the judgment has not 
yet been delivered, this paper will consider first whether there is a right to housing at 
international law, and secondly will examine whether th ~re is a corresponding right in 
New Zealand domestic law. Although the case focuses nn housing, the implications are 
broad and impact on all economic, social and cultural h11man rights. 
There is also the broader question of what is a "right". I [ohfeld argued that "duty" and 
" right" are correlative terms, so that the existence of a cluty is indication of a 
correlative right. 3 His analysis is simple and rigorous an i remains valid . 4 Applying 
Hohfeld's analysis, this paper will accordingly look for :i ny legal duties which might 
represent the correlative of any legal right to housing. 
Il THE LAWSON CASE 
The Facts 
The plaintiff and her husband were joint tenants of a tw,) bedroom property, owned by 
Housing New Zealand .5 They had rented the property Since 1947. At the time of action 
1 See for example J Kelsey The New Zealand Experiment: a worhl 111odelfor structural adjustment? 
(Auckland University Press with Bridget Williams Books, Auck!. nd, 1995). 
2 The judgment is expected during September 1996. 
3 L Lloyd Hampstead and M Freeman Lloyd 's J11troduction to J w1sprudence (5 ed, Stevens & Sons, 
London, 1985) 542. 
4 Above n 3, 443. 
5 Hereinafter known as "HNZ". LAW L!BR.tJlY 
\! - ··1 ··1 •l 1, !IVE SITY OF ,, i I l l1Jr; C'l 
the plaintiff and her husband were receiving the marriec'. rate of national 
superannuation of $304.24 per week. 
In 1992 the Government made changes to the method for providing accommodation 
assistance. As part of the reforms, state housing rents were to be increased to market 
rentals. Once tenants were paying market rates, they were to become eligible for the 
Accommodation Supplement. Tenure protection was intended to be granted to the 
elderly and to those with exceptional difficulties in moving. The transition to market 
rents was to be phased in over a two year period. 
As a result of the reforms the plaintiff's rent increased from $72 per week before the 
first round of rent increases, to the market rate of $165 per week after the last round 
was completed. The plaintiff received an accommodaticn supplement of $52 per week, 
and she and her husband also received a tenure protecti,Jn allowance of $10 per week. 
The plaintiff refused to pay part of the rent, notifying H\J'Z that she and her husband 
would only be paying $75 a week rent to HNZ plus any accommodation supplement 
received. At the time of the action the plaintiff owed HNZ the sum of$2,624.61 in 
rental arrears. 
The Plaintif.f s Arguments 
The action was brought against several defendants. The first defendant is HNZ, which 
is a Company under the Housing Restructuring Act. Tr.~ second and third defendants 
are the Minister of Housing and the Minister of Finance respectively . They are each 
Shareholding Ministers for HNZ. Relief was claimed against the defendants under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972, the common law or r art VII of the High Court 
Rules. 
The counsel for the plaintiff produced extensive evidence showing the impact of the 
reforms on affordability of state housing. It was implicit from the content of the 
material presented that the changes by the Government were retrogressive and that the 
new policy was not affordable by tenants. 
The first cause of action against the first defendant, was that HNZ had failed to 
exercise its discretion genuinely, that is, its decision as t) how much rent to charge 
must be based on the exercise of' independent judgeme1 it' and not dictated by 
Government. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that und1 :r section 4(1 )(b )6 of the 
Housing Restructuring Act 1992, HNZ must take into account the interests of the 
community. 
The second cause of action against all the defendants, \\'as that the charging of the 
market rents without regard to affordability was a breach of section 8 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which states that there is a "right not to be deprived of 
life". It was submitted that market rents would deprive .he Plaintiff and other tenants in 
similar situations of adequate and affordable shelter and as such it was prima facie in 
breach of section 8. 7 This submission was not particularly well developed by the 
plaintiff however, and is open to objection on a number of grounds, and it seems 
unlikely to succeed. Accordingly, this aspect of the plai ,tiff's argument is not analysed 
in detail in this paper. 
The third cause of action against all the defendants wai; that of legitimate expectation. 
It was submitted that the Plaintiff had a legitimate expe : tation to be consulted, and be 
heard, and to receive fair treatment prior to the decisio11 to grant or refuse the benefit. 
6 Section 4(1) of the Housing Restructuring Act 1992 states that the principle objective of the company 
shall be to operate as a successful business ... and to this end be- (I•) an organisation that exhibits a 
sense of social responsibility by having regard to the interests of he community in which it operates. 
7 The only instances where a similar argument has ever succeedc:I appear to have been in India. The 
most well-known cases in this regard are Olga Teffis & Ors v Bo nbay Afunicipal Corporation and 
Ors Nos. 5068-5069 of 1981, and Vayyapuri Kapppusami and O. ·s v the Stale of Afaharashtra and 
Ors. In tl1ese cases, more popularly known as the '·Bombay Pave r1ent Dweffers Case" [1 986] (S.C.) 
180, the Supreme Court of India found that to forcibly evict pavement dwellers in Bombay would 
deprive them of their means of livelihood due, in particular, to C e proximity of their hutments to their 
source of income and employment. It took the rather for\\'ard loo :<ing view, that " it would be sheer 
pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life." Mention should also 
be made oftl1e case of Frances Coralie Muffin v Union Territory of Dehli f 1981] 2 S.C.R. 516, in 
which tl1e Indian Supreme Court found tlrnt "The right to life includes the right to live with human 
dignity and all t11at goes with it, namely the bare necessities of Ii e such as adequate nutrition, 
clotl1ing and shelter. .. " 529. See also S Leckie "The UN Commitlee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: Towards an Appropriate Approach" (1989) 11 Human 
Rights Quarterly 528. In the recent case of Shantistar Builders, Narayan Khimalal Totame [1990) 4 
AIR 630, the Court held that article 21 included the right to she! er. Notably, these cases were not 
cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in the Lawson case. 
The first cause of action against the second and third de :endants was that they had 
failed to have proper regard to the Government's intern ltional obligations. It was 
alleged that the discretion granted to the second and thi rd defendants in respect of 
various actions which resulted in change to the Crown': social objectives ought to be 
exercised in a manner that takes into proper account th1: Government's international 
obligations. The charging by a State-Owned Enterprise Df market rents regardless of 
their affordability and their impact on living standards VI as alleged to be in breach of 
the right to an adequate standard of living including hoL sing. This argument, which 
raises a number of important issues in terms of both intt rnational and domestic law, 
will be the central focus of this paper. 
ill IS THERE A RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING AT INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? 
The starting point must be then, whether New Zealand .s under any duty in 
international law to provide adequate housing. This par: of the paper considers this 
question in respect of treaties and customary international, which are the two principal 
sources of international law. 8 It shows that there is und ,)ubtedly a duty in treaty law, 
but that the exact content of the right generated by it is. unclear. Consequently, it is 
difficult to determine whether the Government's action; in respect of the Lawsons 
were a breach of the right provided in treaty law. Whet 1er there is a duty at customary 
international law, is less certain however. 
Treaties 
The primary source of the right to adequate housing is round in article 11 ( 1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultu ·al Rights. 9 Article 11(1) states : 
8 G Dickinson, M Liepner, S Talas and D Buckingham Underst. nding Law and the Global 
Community (2 ed, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, Toronto, 1995) 56 l 
9 Hereinafter known as the "ICESCR", to which New Zealand is party. It was ratified by New Zea land 
on 28 December 1978. The right to adequate housing is also fou 1d in more specific conventions 
including article 5(e) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, article 27 of the Convention on the Rights oft I e Child, article 43 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all :t. !igrant Workers and Members of their 
Families. Not all these treaties state the right in precisely the sane terms, and the nature of the 
obligation may vary according to the particular context. The gen ~ral right is however that stated in the 
ICESCR. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise t~ e right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himself and his famtly, including adequate 
food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous impnvement of living 
conditions. 111e States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation 
of this right, recognising to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent. 
Article 11 (1) is cast in very broad terms. One of the barriers to the legal 
implementation of housing rights has been the absence of a universally recognised 
definition of the set of entitlements comprising the righ: to adequate housing. 10 The 
traveaux preparatoires of the ICES CR provide little elucidation beyond making it 
clear that the phrase was intended to signify more than ,;i right to bare shelter, 11 and 
there has been a reluctance on the part of the internatio:1al community to consider the 
scope of the right. 12 As recently as HABITAT II this year, 13 States refrained from 
defining the right. 
The most useful and authoritative definition of the right to adequate housing is found 
in General Comment No. 4, of the United Nations Conmittee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.14 It defines the right as having vari:)US components. These include 
legal security of tenure; availability of services, materia ls and infrastructure; affordable 
housing; habitable housing; accessible housing; locatior; and culturally adequate 
housing. The factor that is particularly relevant in relafr:m to the Lawson case is 
"affordable housing". In relation to this, in its General Comment No.4 , the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that: 15 
10 The requirement at United Nations negotiations that legal outcomes be created by consensus seems 
to be largely responsible for the lack of definition, as consensus c n a matter such as the scope of the 
right to adequate housing is virtually impossible due to the diITer ~nt resources, needs and interests of 
each State. Consequently, States do not usually attempt to define the right. Below n 12. 
11 A Devereaux "Australia and the Right to Adequate Housing" 11991) 20 Fed.L.R. 224 . 
12 Interview with Priscilla Williams and Catherine Grant, Unitec Nations Division, Ministry of 
Foreign AJiairs and Trade, 14.8.96 . 
13 HABIT AT II, held in Instanbul from 3 to 14 June 1996 was the sixth and last in a series of large 
United Nations Conferences on socio-economic issues. 
14 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies (1996) United Nations Document No. HR.I/GEN/1/Rcv.2 59, While such general 
comments are not legally binding, they are intended to assist States by clarifying the nature of their 
obligations, and draw on the Committee's experience in examir ng numerous State reports from all 
regions of the world. 
15 Above n 14, 61. 
Steps should be taken by States parties to ensure that t1e percentage of housing-
related costs is, in general, commensurate with income levels. States parties 
should establish housing subsidies for those unable to obtain affordable housing, 
as well as forms and levels of housing finance which adequately reflect housing 
needs. In accordance with the principle of affordability, tenants should be 
protected by appropriate means against unreasonable rent levels or rent 
mcreases . 
Applying the facts of Lawson to this statement, it woulc. appear that prima facie , the 
Government was in breach of its obligations at internati Jnal law. There was a rent 
increase to an unreasonable rent level, as it was incomrrensurate with Mr and Mrs 
Lawson's income. Although the Government provided · hem with subsidies, they were 
not substantial enough to mitigate the huge rent increas-::s . 
The Government could of course raise the defence that there is still plenty of affordable 
housing in New Zealand, but that the Lawsons might h2.ve to relocate to a different 
neighbourhood where the market rents are lower. It is unlikely that the Government 
would give this defence however, as the weekly tenure protection that the Lawsons 
were receiving was aimed at the elderly and those with exceptional difficulties in 
moving, 16 and to insist that the Lawsons relocate woulc make that policy appear 
redundant. The forced relocation of pensioners would c !so generate unfortunate 
publicity for the Government, which would be particularly undesirable for the 
Government in an election year. This does however rai! e the question of how 
contextual is any right to housing, and how much must individual hardship be 
considered in relation to the right? The Lawsons had b~"":en living in their state home for 
27 years, and their sense of loss of rights was clearly acute. But what, really is the 
State's obligation under these circumstances? 
16 See "Human Rights in New Zealand - Report to the United Na tions Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights" (Information Bulletin No.49, Minist -y of Foreign AJTairs and Trade, 
Wellington, 1994) 6. 
Article 11(1) is moreover subject to article 2(1) of the Covenant, which describes 
the nature of the general legal obligations undertaken b) States parties to the 
Covenant. 17 It says that : 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes tc, take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, :!specially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, ,, ·ith a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognis~ d in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the achption oflegislative 
measures. 
Again, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has helped to clarify 
the nature of the duties found in article 2(1) of the Covf:nant, in the course of general 
comments. 
The principal obligation reflected in article 2(1) is to ta~ e steps "with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights ·ecognised" in the Covenant. In 
relation to this phrase, the Committee has noted that the concept of progressive 
realisation constitutes a recognition of the fact that full ·ealisation of all economic, 
social and cultural rights will generally not be able to bE achieved in a short period of 
time. 18 
Nevertheless, the Committee has commented that prog1 essive realisation should not be 
misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. The Committee 
says that while it is necessarily a flexible device, the phrase must also be read in the 
light of the overall objective of the Covenant, which is to establish clear obligations for 
States parties in respect of the full realisation of the rigltts in question. 19 The 
Committee has also addressed the issue of retrogressivi :y, commenting that section 
2(1):20 
17 Above n 14, 55. 
18 Above n 14, 57. 
19 Above n 18. 
20 Above n 14, 58. 
imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures 
in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to 
be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the 
Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maxi-num available 
resources . 
In requiring Governments "to take steps" to realise the ·ights under the ICESCR, 
section 2(1) is imposing an obligation which is of immediate effect, as it is not qualified 
or limited by other considerations. Thus while the full n :alisation of the relevant rights 
may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a 
reasonably short time after the Covenant's entry into fo ·ce for the State concerned.21 
Retrogressive actions are incompatible with this. 
The action that the government took was clearly retrog ·essive in relation to Mrs 
Lawson in that it reduced the affordability of her housir g, and this is true of many state 
tenants. 
Nevertheless, in accordance with the Committee's corn nent that retrogressive 
measures would need to be fully justified by reference tJ the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the fJII use of the maximum 
available resources, an indication of the arguments that might be made by the 
Government can be drawn from its Periodic Reporting o the Committee.22 lt might 
seek to justify its actions by arguing that New Zealand ' ; policies and legislation fully 
comply with the spirit and letter of the Covenant. 23 Fu,· hermore, it might argue that 
the action was necessary to ensure the maintenance anc preservation of all the rights 
embodied in the Covenant, as the Government's actions were part of an overall scheme 
to improve the state of the economy.24 Without taking ::;uch measures, a fu11her decline 
in the economy could make it even more difficult to im~)lement mechanisms for the 
protection of those rights, including the right to adequate housing. In this respect, it 
21 Above n 18. 
22 See above n 16. 
23 See above n 16, 36. 
24 See above n 16, 8. 
might be argued that the Government's actions were a f .111 use of its maximum 
available resources, as the redistribution of assistance w .Ls all that was affordable for 
the present, and also in terms of the future. 
It might moreover be argued that the reforms had a pro.~ressive element in relation to 
other people with housing needs, because the result of the reforms was to make the 
distribution of housing support more even, so that a greater number of people have 
access to the accommodation supplement.25 
On the other hand, it can be taken that at the time of the : changes the Government had 
the resources available to ensure that Mrs Lawson's rer t was not increased . The 
country was again experiencing economic growth, and '.he retrogressive measures 
taken by the Government were essentially for policy ratner than resource reasons. 
Article 2(1) would not therefore appear to provide justification for the Government's 
action in revising Mr and Mrs Lawson's rent. 
It is not possible here to resolve these issues precisely. ·mat the arguments reveal is 
the complexity of discussing these issues as "rights" suuject to judicial decision. The 
arguments go to the heart of Government economic and social policy, and involve 
political issues which are certain to be major issues in forthcoming elections. The 
balances between judicial and legislative functions are c iscussed below. But whatever 
the precise content of that right, there is no doubt that 1 here are international 
obligations on New Zealand in this respect. 
New Zealand ratified the ICESCR in 1978. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties states the fundamental princi pie of tre, ty law pacta sunt servanda, 
that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties tc> it and must be performed by 
them in good faith". 26 As a party to the ICESCR and o:her conventions containing 
provisions pertaining to housing rights, New Zealand i~ thus under an obligation to 
25 See above n 16, 6. 
26 M Shaw International Law (3 cd, Grotius Publications Ltd, Cwnbridge, 1991) 56 l. 
implement them in good faith. It is consequently bound :o have its national 
legislation, policy and practice in line with those interna· ional legal obligations. 
Customary International Law 
The question also arises whether there is a duty to provide adequate housing under 
customary international law, given its direct bearing on domestic legal obligations.27 
Customary international law requires proof of two elements: first, a widespread and 
consistent practice among States; and secondly, a genu·ne belief by States that such 
practice is legally binding, or opinio Juris, as it is comm:mly called .28 
The right to adequate housing has numerous bases in both international and regional 
human rights legal texts . Internationally, the right is found in a range of human rights 
treaties which have each been ratified by a large numbt r of States. It can be identified 
in a number of United Nations declarations,29 and the rght has been extensively 
discussed and supported in global United Nation ' s conbrences. It has also been the 
object of considerable and on-going work within the U11ited Nation ' s human rights 
machinery.30 Most recently, at HABITAT II States reaffirmed the existence of the 
right. 
At the regional level, an array of texts contain clauses c irectly related to the right to 
adequate housing, including documents adopted under the auspices of various regional 
organisations.31 The right is also constitutionally recog11ised in at least 30 States,32 and 
27 The dominant principle of English law, normally characterised as the doctrine of incorporation, is 
that customary rules of international law are to be considered pa, t of the law of the land (i .e. as 
common Jaw) and enforced as such, with the qualification that t1 ey arc incorporated only so far as is 
not inconsistent with Acts of Parliament or prior judicial dccisio, 1s of final authority. See I Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law (4 ed, Clarendon Press, C x.ford, 1990) 44. It appears that New 
Zealand has adopted this position, as evidence of this approach c:in be found in the recent New 
Zealand Court of Appeal cases of The Governor of Pitcairn v Su. ton [ 1995 J I NZLR 426 and 
Controller and Auditor-General v Davison [1996] 2 NZLR 278. 
28 Above n 8. 
29 These include the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, I 95!l (paragraph 4); the Declaration on 
Social Progress and Development, 1969 (pa11 JI, article 10(!)) ; ( c Vancouver Declaration on Human 
Settlements, 1976 (section III) ; the Declaration on the Right to ticvelopment, 1986 (article 8. 1); and 
tJ1e draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (article~ 20 and 23). 
30 R Sacher "Working Paper on the Right to Adequate Housing" ( 1992) United Nations Document No. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/15 , 12. 
31 These include the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC), the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Organisatio I of American States (OAS) and the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). See above n 30, 13 . 
virtually all States maintain policies and legislation prosc.ribing the denial of or, 
more positively, directed at realising adequate housing31 
Despite the considerable number of instruments contain: ng provisions relating to 
adequate housing as well as State practice, it is not, in t 1e end, very clear that this right 
is part of customary international law. Even if there is such a right at customary 
international law, it will be at a very general level. It car therefore safely be said that its 
content will be more limited than under the ICES CR. C )unsel in the Lawson case did 
not try to argue the customary international law question, correctly in the author's 
view. Furthermore, it is not necessary to answer this qu ~stion finally, as the Treaty 
right at international law is binding on New Zealand. 
IV WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE "RIGHT"? 
The obligation on the State to provide adequate housing, and the correlative "right", 
may thus be found in treaty law. As party to the ICESCR, New Zealand has 
international obligations in this respect. But what is the status of that "right" generated 
by those obligations? Could the Lawsons demand that the Government provide them 
with a cheaper house? Or could they argue that they sh,)uld be left under a century old 
government policy, without being forced out because of new economic orthodoxy? 
What is their "right"? 
This issue is more than just a theoretical one, as it may ~!so go to the justiciability of 
the "rights" claimed by the Lawsons. While the domest c Courts have shown 
themselves increasingly willing to take into account tht State's international 
obligations in the civil and political sphere, many comn· entators argue that economic, 
social and cultural rights are qualitatively different. Unci oubtedly, their adjudication 
domestically involves the Courts in political and economic judgments which they have 
traditionally been reluctant to make. 
32 See for example the South African Constitution 1996 which st , tes in article 26(1) that "Everyone 
has the right to have access to adequate housing". 
33 See above n 30. 
The right to adequate housing is a classic economic, social and cultural right. The 
concept of these rights has, as noted, long generated co-1troversy among 
philosophers. 34 A number of commentators continue to :.;ontest the status of those 
rights, as "rights" . 35 They consider that civil and politicz I rights are capable of 
immediate and full realisation whereas economic, social and cultural rights constitute 
no more than long term aspirational goals,36 or privilegEs. 
Governments appear to draw a similar distinction. For, ·..vhereas civil and political 
rights relate to widely shared values to which governments are genuinely committed 
and raise issues that are manageable and within reach, e:onomic, social, and cultural 
rights have not attracted the same level of governmenta' commitment, and concern 
issues that are considered to be inherently intractable and unmanageable and are thus 
much too complex to be dealt with under the rubric of rights .37 
The New Zealand government also appears to take a di Terent approach to economic, 
social, and cultural rights. For example, in January 199; , when the Associate Minister 
for Health was spelling out the rationale for applying th :! user pays principle in various 
social sectors, he made the comment that "health, educ;.tion and welfare services are 
privileges, not rights" .38 It can be assumed that housing would be similarly regarded . 
When the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights questioned whether the 
comment accurately reflects the Government's view, during the course of presenting 
its Periodic Report to the Committee, the Government 1Yoided answering the question 
directly, and instead stressed its continuing commitmen": to the welfare state.39 Further 
evidence that New Zealand treats the rights differently is the fact that the Government 
chose not to include economic, social and cultural righn in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. 
34 See below n 35, 158. There is a huge body of literature on this subject. This part of the paper covers 
some of the more major issues and arguments on the topic, and it is by no means exhaustive. 
35 P Alston and G Quinn "The Nature and Scope of State Parties· obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Hi.man Rights Quarterly 159. 
36 Above n 35. 
37 Above n 35 . 
38 p Hunt "Our rights before fights" New Zealand Herald, New 2 ealand, 27 January 1993, Section 2, 
3. 
39 Above n 16, 12. 
Nevertheless, in the last few years attitudes within the l . nited Nations have 
changed in respect of these rights as there is an increasing recognition that the two 
groups of rights are "parts of a single whole", 40 and Uni ted Nations and various 
regional human rights bodies are trying to devise ways t0 implement economic, social 
and cultural rights. Even so, States still draw distinctions however between economic, 
social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights . 
Various arguments are given in support of the differentiation between the two sets of 
rights. The first and most common is that civil and polifcal rights are in a sense 
"negative rights", whereas economic, social and cultura. rights are "positive" rights. 
The former are characterised as "negative" in that they ·equire only that governments 
should abstain from activities that would violate them, whereas the latter rights require 
active intervention. Closely linked to this is a distinctior between resource-intensive 
and cost-free rights. Thus it is said that civil and politiccd rights can be realised without 
significant costs being incurred, whereas the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights requires a major commitment of resourcE:s. 41 
The distinction is not necessarily quite so clear cut however. Hunt argues that civil and 
political rights can also require positive action on the part of the State. He explains that 
if individuals are to enjoy rights such as the right to a fair trial , States must build 
courts, pay the salaries of judges, prosecutors, adminisl rators and interpreters, and in 
some circumstances, provide individuals with free legal assistance.42 The Human 
Rights Committee is also increasingly looking for "posi tive" action by States in 
enshrining civil and political rights in their law, in maki11g them justiciable.43 
Another reason for the alleged distinction between the ~ights is that civil and political 
rights are seen as essentially non-ideological in nature , nd are potentially compatible 
with most systems of government . By contrast, economic, social and cultural rights are 
40 See in particular the Vienna Declaration and program of action adopted by the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights, reaffirm ed in article 5 that "All ii .llllilll rights are uniYersal 1 indiYisible 
and interdependent and interrelated". See also below n 42, 142. 
41 Above n 35 . 
42 p Hunt "Reclaiming Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" ( 993) I Waikato Law Review 151. 
43 Above n 12. 
often perceived to be of a deeply ideological nature, necessitating an unacceptable 
degree of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, and to be inherently 
incompatible with a free market economy. 44 
In its General Comment 3, the Committee of Economic. Social and Cultural Rights 
attempted to dispel the association of the rights with idc ology. The Committee stated 
that: 45 
in terms of political and economic systems the Covena ·1t is neutral and its 
principles cannot accurately be described as being predicated exclusively 
upon the need for, or the desirability of a socialist or?. capitalist system, or a 
mixed, centrally planned, or laissez-faire economy, or upon any other 
particular approach .. . the rights recognised in the Co\·P-nant are susceptible of 
realisation within the context of a wide variety of economic and political 
systems 
It is also argued by some commentators that civil and pJlitical rights are justiciable 
whereas economic, social and cultural rights are not. 46 ln support of their view they 
commonly argue that the most effective realisation of e ,onomic, social and cultural 
rights requires policy choices, for which judges lack thE- necessary expertise and 
political accountability.47 Sir lvor Richardson has also Expressed the concern that the 
increased resort to the protection ofrights creates difficulties for Judges, is costly, and 
can ultimately impinge upon the interests of the community.48 
A separate group of theorists asse11 that economic, social and cultural rights are 
justiciable. Amongst other things, they argue that the jL diciary has always been 
44 Above n 35, 160. 
45 Above n 14. 
46 For some commentators the justiciability of a right one of the , ,ssential determinants of whether it is 
a "real" right. Kelson has in fact stated that ' the essential eleme11t [ofa right] is the legal power 
bestowed upon the [individual] by the legal order to bring about , by a law suit , the execution of a 
sanction as a reaction against the nonfulfillment of the obligatio11". See above n 35, 169. 
47 See above n 42, 154. 
48 Richardson's analysis focused predominantly on civil libcrtan 111 values, but his arguments are 
equally applicable to the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. See I Richardson 
"Right's Jurispnidencc - Justice For All?" in P Joseph (ed) Essays 0 11 the Con titution (Brooker's Ltd, 
Wellington, 1995) 61. 
involved in the formulation of law and policy. They also point out that civil and 
political rights may themselves be subject to some degrEe of policy-making. 49 Hunt 
claims that the judicial difficulties traditionally associate :1 with the implementation of 
social rights has been overstated, and has stressed that .he courts must get into the 
business of protecting economic, social and cultural rigrts. 50 
The nature of the compliance mechanisms under the two Covenants is also used to 
distinguish the rights. 51 Civil and political rights have had more compliance measures 
than economic, social, and cultural rights. The Internati )nal Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights52 establishes the Human Rights Committee to consider Periodic 
Reports on compliance by States Parties and also provides under article 41 a State to 
State complaint mechanism; moreover under the First C•ptional Protocol States agree 
to allow individuals to bring human rights complaints a,eainst their own countries at the 
international level. 53 The compliance mechanism under he ICESCR is weaker and 
more permissive, comprising solely of Periodic Reports by States Parties to the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 54 
The nature of the States Parties' general obligations is also different in the ICCPR and 
the ICES CR. The general view is that under article 2(1) of the IC CPR there is an 
immediate obligation. 55 However, as already noted, unc:er the ICESCR the States 
Parties general obligation is not immediate, but explicit' y progressive. It is also subject 
to the availability of resources . 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Righs makes it clear however, that 
too much should not be made oft he different nature of the obligations in respect of the 
two Covenants, "the fact that realisation over time, or in other words progressively, is 
49 Above n 47. 
50 Above n 42, 141. 
51 Above n 42, 144. 
52 Hereinafter known as the "ICCPR". 
53 Above n 8, 564. 
54 Above n 8, 561. There is however increasing interest internati)nally, in developing an individual 
complaints mechanism under the ICESCR also. 
55 It has however been argued that the immediate obligation uncl ;r the ICCPR can be subject to 
progressive application in some circumstances, under article 2(2 l. See above n 42, 14 7. 
foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpret1!d as depriving the 
obligation of all meaningful content" . 56 
States have clear legal duties under treaties to which th:y are party. They cannot 
disregard these duties. Although the actual status of the economic, social and cultural 
rights within these treaties as "rights" has been subject to much debate, the preceding 
arguments suggest that they should be regarded as "real" rights. The fact that human 
rights are directed towards the creation of societal conditions by the State in which 
individuals may develop to their fullest potential, as wet as protecting individuals from 
the exercise of State authority in certain areas of their Ii v1es, 57 is further support of their 
status as "real" rights. Thus, the distinctions between the rights outlined, would not 
appear to affect its qualitative status as a "right". Rathe·, those differences would 
appear to be relevant only insofar as they make a differ::nce to the speed with which 
the rights are implemented. 58 
Certainly, from the Lawsons' viewpoint, such distinctions are likely to be seen as fine 
ones. New Zealand has international obligations in the t·conomic, social and cultural 
area, just as it does in the civil and political sphere. The Government's changes to its 
housing policy are no less real for the Lawsons than de1 ogations from their civil and 
political rights might be. They would undoubtedly find 1ard to understand any 
distinction which might be drawn by the Courts between their treatment of civil and 
political, and economic, social and cultural rights. 
V DOES THE RIGHT EXTEND TO MUNICII AL LAW? 
The New Zealand Government is under duties with respect to housing in a number of 
statutes, the most notable of which are the Housing Re-;tructuring Act 1992 and the 
Human Rights Act 1993 .59 Consequently, it could be s::id that New Zealand citizens 
have "rights" in respect to housing. However, the protE ctions contained in these 
statutes are not so broad as to protect people such as the Lawsons. Indeed, it was 
56 Above n 14. 
57 S Davidson Human Rights (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993) 24. 
58 Above n 57, 43 . 
59 Sections 53 to 56 of the Human Rights Act 1993 prohibit diSCJ imination in the provision of land, 
housing and other accommodation. 
through the implementation of the Housing Restructuring Act 1992 that the 
Lawsons found themselves in the position which led them to bring proceedings. The 
real question is whether in New Zealand there is any rignt in respect of housing which 
extends beyond the protections found in those statutes. Ultimately the determination of 
this question is dependent upon whether New Zealand'~ duties at international law in 
respect of the "right to adequate housing" create rights for New Zealand citizens at the 
municipal level, notwithstanding the fact that they have not been expressly 
incorporated into New Zealand municipal law. 
The Orthodox Position 
The orthodox position in New Zealand is that unincorporated treaties which affect 
private rights or alter the law do not enter the domestic law unless or until treaty 
obligations are expressly given effect to by Parliament. This rule arises because the 
ratification of a treaty is an executive act, and if international obligations formed part 
of New Zealand municipal law without Parliament enacting legislation to implement 
them, the sovereignty of Parliament would be violated. The principle was stated thus 
in Ashby v Minister of Immigration :60 "it is well settled that the making of a treaty is 
an executive act while the performance of its obligation;, if they entail alteration of the 
existing domestic law, requires legislative action". 6 1 
Ministerial Decision Making 
It is at this point that the first cause of action against the second and third defendants in 
the Lawson case becomes relevant. As noted, the plaint iff in Lawson argued that the 
Ministers failed to have regard to New Zealand's intern.Ltional legal obligations with 
regard to housing, and that the international covenants are relevant considerations in 
the exercise of discretions by the shareholding Ministen . The counsel for the plaintiff 
in Lawson relied on and referred to a number of authori '. ies in this respect. However, 
there are three possible directions that Williams J could take in determining this 
particular issue. First, he could take the Ashby approad. that Ministers are not in any 
way bound by any treaty. Secondly, he could take the approach found in Tavita v 
60 [1981] 1 NZLR 222. 
61 Above n 60, 229. 
Minister of lmmigration62 that Ministers are bound to ",:onsider explicitly" the 
obligations in the exercise of their discretion. Thirdly, h1: could take the Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh63 approach that Ministers are obliged in New 
Zealand Jaw to exercise any discretion in conformity with treaty obligations. Whjch of 
these three possibilities represents New Zealand Jaw would obviously have a crucial 
effect on the Lawson case. It is therefore necessary to e:<amine the recent case law. 
There has been an increasing tendency on the part of thr, courts to require decision 
makers exercising judicially reviewable powers to have :egard to international 
obligations. 64 In recent years the law in New Zealand ar d generally in the 
Commonwealth has been changing in this respect, altho .1gh recent decisions have not 
finally settled the issues. Ashby was the first of these ca.;es. It concerned an attempt to 
stop the South African Springbok rugby team's 1981 tcur ofNew Zealand. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the tour would involve a violation by New Zealand of its 
obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimjnation. The Springboks needed entry permits b~fore they could come into the 
country. According to statute, the Minister oflmmigration had a discretionary power 
to issue the permits. The plaintiffs argued that the Mini:;ter should exercise his 
discretion in a manner consistent with New Zealand's iuternational obligations, and 
decline to issue entry permits to the Springboks. It was acknowledged on behalf of the 
Mnister that he had not taken into account either of the international instruments 
relied on. 
Although at first instance the ChiefJustice dismissed the plaintiff's application, he 
accepted that the Convention was a relevant considera~ion. He was not prepared to 
find however that the Minister had failed to take it intc account. In the Court of ' 
Appeal, the Mnister filed an affidavit which confirmed that he had not given specific 
consideration to the Convention, but that he was awarE of the active opposition of the 
government of New Zealand and the United Nations to apartheid . The appeal was 
62 (1994] 2 NZLR 257. 
63 (1995) 128 ALR 353. 
64 R Harrison "Domestic Enforcement of International Human R ghts in Courts of Law: Some Recent 
Developments" [1995] NZLJ 262 . 
dismissed. 65 The court found that when exercising his discretion, the Minister was 
not required to take the Convention into account. The c 1ief principle which Ashby is 
taken to stand for is that Ministers cannot be judicially compelled to comply with 
international Treaties, even those to which New Zealand is a Party, when they are 
exercising ministerial discretion. 66 Nevertheless, there was recognition in the Court that 
some international obligations are so manifestly important that no reasonable Minister 
could fail to take them into account. 67 
The more recent case of Tavita also appears to have ca!:t doubt on the absolute nature 
of the principle in Ashby. In that case, Mr Ta vita, a citi:2.en of Western Samoa, was an 
overstayer in New Zealand who was attempting to seek the cancellation of a warrant 
for his removal on humanitarian grounds. An appeal to rhe Minister was declined. Mr 
Tavita commenced judicial review proceedings, placing reliance on the ICCPR and the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. He sought an interim order for a stay of 
his removal. 68 
The Crown had argued in this case that the Minister w;is entitled to ignore 
international instruments, consistent with Ashby. But in Tavita the Court found this 
argument "unattractive ... apparently implying that New :~ealand' s adherence to the 
international instruments has been at least partly windo·N-dressing". 69 Cooke P went on 
to state that when statutory discretion is being exercise-J by the decision maker, 
international human rights obligations must be taken into account as a mandatorv 
relevant consideration. Consequently, the decision of tr:e New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Tavita severely eroded the basic principle of Ashby that discretionary powers 
do not have to be exercised in accordance with treaty c bligations. 70 Nevertheless, 
Ashby has not been specifically overruled. Moreover, the persuasiveness of Tavita is 
questionable as it was an interim judgment, and is expli ::itly not a final ruling on the 
legal issue. 
65 See P Hunt and M Bedggood "The International Law Dimension of Human Rights in New Zealand" 
in G Huscroft (ed) Rights and Freedoms (Brooker's Ltd, Wcllin!:ton, 1995) 37, 54. 
66 J Elkind "Ashby v Minister of J111111igration: Ovcrrnlcd?" [199,q NZLJ 95 . 
67 Above n 60, 225. 
68 Above n 64. 
69 Above n 62, 266. 
70 Above n 66, 98. 
Although the Court of Appeal has been presented with the opportunity to clarify the 
law further in the New Zealand context in the recent ca1 es of Puli 'uvea v The Removal 
Review Authority & Anor,71 and Rajan v The Minister rJ lmmigration,72 it has avoided 
dealing with this aspect. 
The High Court of Australia has gone considerably further in than the New Zealand 
courts to date in its important judgment in Teoh . Teoh v:as a case with a close factual 
resemblance to Tavita. It also concerned the United Na ions Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, to which Australia is also a party. A major ty of the High Court of 
Australia held that, while the provisions of an international treaty to which Australia is 
a party do not form part of Australian law unless incoq: orated into the domestic law by 
stature, and so cannot operate as a direct source of ind. vidual rights and obligations, 
nevertheless the ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the Executive 
Government to the world and to the Australian people 1 hat the Executive Government 
and its agencies will act according to the convention. I1: Teoh the Australian High 
Court held that ratification of an international convention by the Executive can create a 
legitimate expectation that the Executive will act in acc)rdance with the convention.73 
Accordingly, the ratification of the convention, it was held, was an adequate 
foundation for a "legitimate expectation" that administrative decision makers would act 
in conformity with that convention.74 
How will the New Zealand courts treat Teoh? As a dec ,sion from the High Court of 
Australia, it is highly persuasive. However, the Australian Government responded 
negatively to the Teoh case, and introduced the Admim,·trative Decisions (Effect of 
International Instruments) Bill 1995 into the House of Representatives on 28 June 
1995.75 The primary provision in the Bill is clause 5 which provides that, the "fact that 
Australia is bound by, or a party to, a particular international instrument, or that an 
71 Unreported, 8 July 1996, Court of Appeal, CA 236/95. 
72 Unreported, 30 July 1996, Court of Appeal , CA 177/95 . 
73 Above n 63, 366. 
74 Above n 63 , 373. 
75 Report of the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Colllmillee Trick or Treaty? 
Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties (The Pa ·Iiamcnt of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1995), 91. 
enactment reproduces or refers to a particular international instrument, does not 
give rise to a legitimate expectation" .76 The passage of the Bill in Australia would of 
course only change the law of Australia, leaving it still c pen for the High Court's 
approach to be followed in other jurisdictions including New Zealand. 
In this respect however, the comments of Thomas Jin t 1e New Zealand Court of 
Appeal Winebox11 decision, raised doubts about the auf10rity of a case which has been 
reversed in Parliament. Thomas J commented that: 
It seems to me that the authority of a case which has b ::en effectively reversed by 
an Act of Parliament must be seriously weakened. In effect, the rationale of the 
case has not been accepted. It would be stilted for later courts to fail to have 
regard to the subsequent history of an authority and to the fact that it was an 
informed Parliament which declared that it no longer n;presented the law in that 
country. 
Accordingly, if the Bill is passed in Australia - which arpears to be increasingly 
unlikely78 - the authority of the Teoh case may be substantially weakened in New 
Zealand. That said, in the recent Court of Appeal case HZ Maori Council & Ors v 
Attorney-General & Ors19, Thomas J, in his dissenting judgment, appeared to affirm 
the persuasiveness of Teoh in New Zealand law when he commented that: 80 
If an international treaty which has been signed and ·atified but not passed 
into law can found a legitimate expectation, it is automatic that this 
country ' s recognised fundamental constitutional doc.1ment, the Treaty of 
Waitangi , can also found a legitimate expectation . The reasoning of the 
majority in the Teoh case seems to me to be directly applicable. 
76 See above n 75. Notably, all the implications of such a broad s atement may not have been intended, 
and may cause surprise on the part of Australia's treaty partners. Presumably other States party to a 
treaty with Australia, at the very least, are entitled to a legitimat( expectation that it will comply with 
its treaty obligations in accordance with the principle of pact a s1,11t servanda! 
77 Controller and Audi tor-General v Davison [ 1996] 2 NZLR 2"H. 
78 See for example "NZ sets a lesson for Australia" The Canber··a Times, Canberra, Australia, 8 July 
1996, 5 which stated that there is now no real likelihood that the legislation will get the support of the 
Opposition in the Senate. 
79 Unreported, 13 June 1996, Court of Appeal , CA 78/96. 
80 Above n 79, 42. 
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The leading English case is Brind v Secreta,y of State ji>r the Home Department, 81 and 
it supports the more traditional approach. The Minister~ of Housing and Finance in the 
Lawson case, argued Brind in support of their position . . n Brind, the House of Lords 
was confronted with issues akin to those raised in Ashb:, 1 and came to a similar view. 
Brind concerned the European Convention on Human :L.ights, a treaty which has not 
been incorporated into English domestic law by way of statute. According to Lord 
Ackner, if the Min.ister was obliged to exercise his discretion in conformity with the 
Convention, "this inevitably would result in incorporating the Convention into English 
domestic law by the back door". 82 Thus, it was held tha~ although the courts would 
interpret domestic legislation in a manner which conformed to the Convention where 
possible, there was no corresponding presumption of dc ,mestic law that the courts 
would review the exercise of administrative discretion c n the basis that such discretion 
had to be exercised in conformity with the Convention. 
In Tavita, when considering the Brind decision, Cooke P commented that: 83 
It is not now appropriate to discuss how far Brind, in :;ome respects a 
controversial decision, might be followed in New Zeal.md on the question 
whether, when an Act is silent as to relevant considera tions, international 
obligations are required to be taken into account as su,;h. 
The Brind case has not been followed in a number of c,.ses including Teoh, and the 
New Zealand Maori Council Case in which Thomas J favoured the Teoh reason.ing 
over that in Brind. 84 
It would appear from the New Zealand and Australian cases that there is now room to 
invoke international human rights covenants in the context of administrative decision-
making by the executive, either on the basis of the Tav, •a " relevant considerations" 
approach, or on the basis of the Teoh "legitimate expec tation" approach, or both. How 
RI [1991] AC 696 . 
82 Above n 81, 716. 
83 Above n 69 . 
84 Above n 79, 41. 
far the courts will take this, however is still uncertain. l he most recent 
developments noted above would suggest that in one Judges' mind at least, the line of 
reasoning in Teoh is attractive. The Lawson judgment, i;hould it go to appeal, may help 
settle this issue once and for all. 
This author anticipates however, that Williams J may trr to avoid this question. The 
fact that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has itself av )ided making a definitive ruling 
in the recent cases of Puli 'uvea and Rajan, is likely to make him hesitant about 
tackling such a highly controversial and critical questio11. Furthermore, in cases such as 
this, where there is doubt about the precise content of an international obligation, the 
courts are likely to be very careful about importing inte··national law vagueness into 
New Zealand municipal law. Again, this brings back the- issue of the role of the 
judiciary, compared with that of the elected legislature. Consequently, it is anticipated 
that Williams J may find in favour of the plaintiff or the defendants on another, less 
significant ground, which would enable him to decide tl1at it is unnecessary to consider 
the question of the relationship between ministerial decision-making and international 
law. 
In the event that Williams J does address this issue, however it is to be expected that 
he will apply either the Tavita approach or the Teoh approach. It is unlikely that he will 
revert back to the traditional approach found in cases s11ch as Ashby or Brind. He 
could however decide to follow the reasoning in Anker,· v Attorney-Genera/85 that 
even if the Ministers had not specifically referred to the r international obligations when 
taking their decisions, it could not be assumed that the~, had not considered them. 
Indeed, in the Lawson case the Crown argued that affo1 dability concerns were 
fundamental overall to the Government's policies and Jl'[inisterial decisions. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Given that the legislation in place which pertains to hoi. sing has only narrow 
application, the question of whether there is otherwise i t "right to adequate housing" in 
New Zealand municipal law is highly significant for the Lawsons, and for other people 
85 (1995) NZAR 241. 
similarly affected by the housing reforms. Yet the issue s fraught with difficulties. 
Amongst other things, there are questions as to the con1 ent of any such right, the 
status of the right, the impact of unincorporated treaties on Ministerial decision-
making, and whether economic, social and cultural righ1 s are properly justiciable. 
These issues have been identified and discussed in this raper. However, it is not 
possible to come to any substantial conclusions without any further signals from the 
judiciary or Parliament. 
The Lawson case thus stands at the edge of current deb ltes about all these issues, and 
it provides a real opportunity to develop New Zealand domestic law in this respect. 
Even if it does not do so, the issues will remain . The in ternational community' s 
increasing focus on economic, social and cultural rights is likely to be reflected in 
domestic litigation as well. Sooner or later, the New Zealand courts will have to 
address these issues. 
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